Public Diplomacy after COVID: Is China Winning the Global PR Battle?

>> John Haskell: I am joined by Carla Freeman, the Library of Congress’ chair, and U.S. China relations, and director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies Also, we have Hal Brands as the incoming Kissinger chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Kluge Center Hal is distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins and he’s also a senior scholar at the American Enterprise Institute Welcome to you both Let me start with a question for — for Carla and then it will be the same question to kind of give the overview of how we’re thinking about public diplomacy in the wake of COVID Where are U.S. China relations going? >> Carla Freeman: Well, I don’t think they’re headed in a very good direction We started the year with some promising signs in the relationship I mean we had concluded an — an interim trade agreement, and it looked like we were putting the trade war on hiatus, and we could move forward in the relationship But the coronavirus is certainly sent that potential positive movement in the relationship in a tailspin and highlighted some of the — the — the problems in the relationship that had been ongoing And — and now I think pushing them — has pushed them increasingly to the forefront of — of the dynamic between the two countries We are — we really are facing a China that is — is far more publicly hostile to the United States, it has used the coronavirus as a — as a public — a relations opportunity to push its message out about — about China’s superior system And — and has — has also sent a strong message that is designed to communicate that the United States is — is — is a failing country And highlighting most recently, the — the social — this — the — the unrest that the marches against police brutality in — in the United States as a — as a — as a feature or a sign of — of U.S. problems So, we’re going to come out of this having — having a — a much harder time of finding — finding footholds, toeholds and — with — with China to work on — on issues together You know, I’m an eternal optimist, so when — when we first faced this crisis, I thought that the coronavirus has a global challenge where — you know, we — we all need to work together, would provide an opportunity for the two countries to come together, and the moment just isn’t right I think there’s just so much mistrust on the two sides And — and we are — we are going to come out of this with all of the same geostrategic challenges that we faced before the coronavirus but with many economic burdens to — to address and on both sides And I think for — what this means for China — and you can see it already playing it — playing — this already playing out in the — in — in the high altitudes on the — on the — the China India the border is a — a China that is going to be much more defensive and focused because — on — on — on asserting its — its — its — its sovereignty, its interests overseas, because it faces such — so many challenges internally And Xi Jinping has to be perfect and when — when the Chinese government doesn’t perform well under his leadership, then there is — there are problems And so, I think we’re going to see what you might describe as diversionary efforts by China overseas And all of that will just bode ill for the U.S. China relationship >> John Haskell: Where do you think things are going in the wake of the pandemic, Hal? >> Hal Brands: So, I think Carla has it basically right unfortunately, which is that — you know, even in the run up to the pandemic, I think the assessment of a lot of people who watch the relationship closely was that whatever trade deal — whatever phase one trade deal we got was really going to be more of a truce rather than a lasting resolution of the issues dividing the two countries And — and it had become increasingly common to talk about a — a new — new Cold War between the United States and China And you can — you can like that analogy,

you can not like that analogy, but — but what it captured was that there was an increasing sense — certainly, in the United States, and as I understand it, in certain Chinese decision making circles as well, that the relationship was headed for deepening competition, that the competition was simultaneously strategic, economic, and ideological in nature in the way that — that Carla pointed out in the sense that the competition involved questions of whether authoritarian or democratic systems were better suited for success in the 21st century And so, the response to coronavirus was viewed through that lens, it was viewed I think in a zero sum rather than a positive sum lens in both capitals And so, the initial response in Washington was, hey, great, this is going to accelerate U.S. China economic decoupling Firms are going to come home from China This is a big problem for China, maybe not a big problem for the world, that obviously was a misjudgment But as the crisis deepened, you saw a virtual absence of U.S. China cooperation or even the high level dialogue at — at certain point And so, the crisis has had the effect of sharpening all of the perceptions of danger and competition that were already moving the relationship in a — in a fairly challenging direction And so, if you look at the public polling and how Americans view China, coronavirus has accomplished something that a decade plus of assertive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea couldn’t, it’s convinced a majority of Americans that U.S. policy toward China should be either tougher than it is now or as tough as it is now, and that the Chinese Communist Party represents a significant challenge to their prosperity and wellbeing I’m sure there are similar dynamics at work in — in Beijing And so — you know, Ronald Reagan, when he was talking to Soviet leaders back in the 1980s, used to kind of bemuse everybody by saying, well, if aliens came down from outer space, the United States and the Soviet Union would resolve their differences very quickly and cooperate on the common threat We’ve had kind of the closest approximation of that happening in terms of this exogenous shock to the system over the past few months, but it’s actually pushed the two countries farther apart by highlighting all the things they don’t like about each other >> John Haskell: You brought up that Cold War analogy, which you hear people talk about on Capitol Hill and other places, and — you know, the commentary on that Where does that analogy fall short? >> Hal Brands: So, it falls short in a lot of places and I think that it’s important to clarify that — you know, people who use the new Cold War analogy usually aren’t saying that the U.S. China competition is exactly the same or nearly the same as the U.S. Soviet competition because there are so many obvious differences The level of economic integration between the United States and China is — orders of magnitude greater than it was for the U.S. and the Soviet Union The — the levels of interconnectedness between American allies and China are — are greater still And there are a variety of other ways in which the Chinese Regime is different than the Soviet regime, in which the geography of the competition is different, and so on and so forth I think the best argument you can make in favor of the Cold War analogy is basically twofold, that there are challenges the United States faced during the Cold War that it will face in a long term competition with China These challenges might be maintaining a diverse and fractious coalition over many years It might be using a comp as an opportunity to improve the functioning of one system and one’s quality at home Those sorts of broad challenges applied during the Cold War and I think, to some extent, they apply today The other good defense of the Cold War analogy I think is that the Cold War is simply the only time in America’s history where the United States has geared up over a period of decades for explicit self-conscious competition with an authoritarian power And so, we are going to, consciously or unconsciously, be pillaging the Cold War’s history for lessons in dealing with China And so, perhaps we ought to do it more formally and systematically rather than less formally and systematically >> John Haskell: Now Hal brought up — Carla, Hal brought up the question of whether autocratic or authoritarian regimes handled crises better than — than democracies Do you have — do you have perspective on that? >> Carla Freeman: Well, I think — I think if you compare the U.S. and — and Chinese responses you — you probably come out giving the Chinese higher marks in — in — before being able to manage and control the disease

But it — it continues to flare up in China, of course, and — and it’s not over there yet, and we’re not sure exactly what they — this is — how the story will end But China has spent much of the last decade rebuilding its healthcare system and has — has an — a better ability to — to deliver treatment to large numbers of people, partly because it can — it can throw up buildings quickly, and — and order people to move from different regions, and — and so forth, and all of those things that — that authoritarian systems can do But, of course, the — the disease never would have progressed as rapidly as it did, and possibly would not have become the pandemic that it has become had China had a more open and transparent political system And now this is a lesson that [inaudible] and — during the SARS epi — epidemic of 2002, 2003 learned was — was that — you know, when it’s — it’s not unusual for local governments to suppress information I mean one of my colleagues has likened the situation sort of the drop Jaws movie, where — you know, the local mayor didn’t want to let anybody know that there was a — a man eating shark because he wanted to keep the beaches open So, it’s not — that — that, alone, is not a feature of an authoritarian system But the problem in China was that the desire to control information, suppress information, and so even though there were technical systems in place to — to report up the chain, the local government suppressed information But the big — but the big key was that — that — that the flows of information to — to experts and so on got stymied because — because Xi Jinping wanted to control — control the message And — and so, I — when — when — I’m going back to what I was saying about — [ Inaudible ] Learned about — about managing epidemics in China is that you need to have more channels of — for information and — and — and flows And so, after — after the SARS epidemic, there was an effort to relax controls over the media so that media could report more openly about problems at the local level, recognizing that local governments have — there’s this principle aging problem in between local governments and the central government Xi — Xi Jinping’s centralization and control over information is — and it’s strengthening of — of — of the authoritarian political system in China is definitely — has definitely been a huge source of the — of — of — of this rapid spread of the disease because it — there just wasn’t enough information getting out to the local public, and to the — to the — the international community early enough >> John Haskell: Hal, do you have a perspective on that? >> Hal Brands: Yeah I — I would add that — you know, while the Chinese seemed to have implemented some very harsh and — and effective measures in suppressing the disease aft — after it had progressed to a very dangerous point, it’s really hard for us to tell how effective that Chinese response has been because the information that’s coming out of China is so thoroughly distorted And so, my colleague Derek Scissors at — at AEI has done sort of some basic math checking Chinese numbers of reported cases and deaths gone under — from coronavirus, and basically, they don’t pass the laugh test and so it’s hard for us to know whether those numbers are off by a factor of two, or by a factor of ten, or whatever But it testifies to some of the problems that — that Carla was highlighting in dealing with authoritarian regimes And I — I would just add that I think you can find examples of authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian systems that have performed fairly well in dealing with coronavirus I think Singapore probably wins the prize in that respect You can also find examples of democracies that have actually performed exceedingly well in dealing with — with COVID, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Germany, even the [inaudible], a larger country And so, neither a political system seems to have a monopoly on success or failure in grappling with this — this disease My — I tend to think that democracies, on balance, will do better over the long run because they probably have higher levels of transparency, better information sharing, and more trust in government authorities, all of which public health people will tell you are critical to getting on top of pandemics, but you can find exceptions to those rules in the current case as well >> John Haskell: Let’s get to — Carla, let’s get to the — to the — something of that people in Congress

and of course elsewhere are very concerned, about what’s been going on in — in Hong Kong and indeed, Taiwan How is — how are recent events, the — the protests and the — and the crackdown, how are that — how are they affecting U.S China relations, not — what’s your perspective on that? >> Carla Freeman: I think the Hong Kong crisis, it is one that is — is emerging a sort of — I don’t know if it’s ground zero or Sino-American, tensions but it is certainly encapsulating the — our — the — the — many of the issues that we — we have working with China, partly because we — although we weren’t directly involved in the — in the handover, we — the United States has been deeply concerned about maintaining the one country, two systems’ commitment that — that China made when the British completed the handover in 1997 of Hong Kong to the mainland And since the early 1990s, the United — the United States — U.S. Congress has required a review of this — the status of Hong Kong, ensuring that — that the one country, two systems’ formula has been maintained And that — that formula is supposed to allow the Hong Kong Chinese to continue the way of life that existed under British rule, and also to expand a democratic process — in — in — in choosing local leaders, and that has not happened And now we’ve had a series of efforts by China first in extradition, an effort to — to — through the China — through the Hong Kong government to [inaudible] extradition law that would have allowed — expanded China’s ability to — to extradite people from — from Hong Kong to the mainland, as well as this — this national security law, which — which will enable — give — it’s — it’s very hard to know exactly how China will use it at the moment because it’s only in draft form, but it — it would enable the Chinese government to charge people with treason and that kind of thing It will definitely — it will definitely inhibit free speech, and — and — and meanwhile, the Chinese government has not enabled the expansion of — of — of — of direct elections in Hong Kong, as many people had — in Hong Kong — had expect would happen And so, we have a situation where Hong — the — you know, if you’re looking for — I think — you know, the U.S. had seen Hong Kong as kind one step ahead, a pot — potential beacon for the rest of China, and instead, we’re seeing China in — — increasingly centralized an authoritarian China, tightening its grip over Hong Kong and — and — and rolling back its political independence and — and — or autonomy, rather, and it’s — and the political freedoms inside Hong Kong And so, that is — that sends — it’s sort of affirms concerns about the direction of politics in China, and not to mention, deep concern about the future of — of a — of a city and that has plagued has — has really been a beacon for free trade and — and — and open society on China’s periphery And I — I won’t get into the Taiwan issue now, maybe — maybe I’ll go back to you, we can pick that up in a moment >> John Haskell: Yeah Hal, so — so Carla is looking at a large measure from the — the Chinese perspective What’s — what’s our perspective? What are we doing? How are we responding What responsibilities does Congress have? Let me turn it to you >> Hal Brands: So, I think the — the Chinese gamble in making this move now, which I assume was being prepared for some time, was that the international response would not be particularly painful, either because countries that might be in a position to respond are — are either economically dependent on China, or are distracted by coronavirus and other things And so far, that gamble seems to have paid off a little bit in dealing with the European Union, for instance, which is decided to go the route of kind of strongly worded letter with no substance attached to it in its relationship with China But — but there has been a stronger response from the United Kingdom so far, which has basically said, we’re going to create a path to citizenship for up

to 3 million residents of — of Hong Kong And we have at least the makings of a stronger response from the United States And so, shortly in the aftermath of the introduction of the national security law, Secretary Pompeo said that the United States had determined that Hong Kong no longer enjoys a substantial degree of autonomy from — from China, and those are kind of the magic words in the way that — that Carla talked about because that opens the door to a variety of measures to strip away the special status that Hong Kong has in U.S. policy and — and U.S. law What we don’t know yet is how aggressively the administration will seek to strip back that — that status And so, we could see everything up to basically a Hong Kong special commercial status being suspended, and so it would then be subject to all of the tariffs, and — and all of the trade frictions that have afflicted U.S economic relations with the rest of — of mainland China And that would presumably have a fairly significant impact on Hong Kong’s status as a commercial and financial center, although how exactly it plays out, I think we’re all still trying to figure out And so, that’s — that’s kind of what’s to be watched at the moment How — how far is the administration going to go in terms of levying sanctions of one sort or another in response to this episode? And clearly, there’s a significant degree of latitude for Congress here as well And so, there are a number of congressional representatives and senators who have shown a strong interest in Hong Kong issues over the years, and so I would imagine that those folks are in communication with the State Department right now, trying to shape the administration’s response, and may be considering responses of their own >> John Haskell: So, are there red lines for China? And if so, what are they with respect to the West taking actions — or taking positions on Hong Kong and Taiwan? >> Carla Freeman: Any — any move by the United States to encourage independence is the big red line and that particularly applies to — to Taiwan It hasn’t been something the United States has pressed for but — with respect to Hong Kong We have — we have really just ask that the Chinese uphold the basic — basic law and — and that the — the — the — the agreement — the joint declaration that the — the Chinese and British signed So, we — we have stuck to that and rather than pushing for independence There are — there is an independence movement in Hong Kong and we’re — some of our political leaders, for example, to stand next to pro-independence Hong Kong — Hong Kong citizens, that would be a big — that would be seen as a — a major policy shift by the United States and the Chinese would — would — would take action They would take action not so much against the United States but against Hong Kong, and I think that’s something we really have to be cautious about in our policy, to recognize that the — that — that — that the Chinese response to whether it is our — our decision to decertify Hong Kong as — or any other actions that we will take, we have to recognize that they are going to be — they’re going to affect the Hong Kong citizens — Hong Kong citizens first and foremost And that is the same — a bigger discussion on Taiwan policy, the same with our Taiwan policy There aren’t — the — the red line there is for the United States to champion full sovereignty independence for Taiwan, we would see all kinds of repercussions >> John Haskell: Hal, where are you on the red line question? >> Hal Brands: So, I’ll take the Taiwan piece of it because one of the really interesting things about COVID is that it has produced a stronger outpouring of American support, or at least admiration for Taiwan, right, which is the Democratic China that handled the crisis very, very well in an exemplary fashion And I think it is leading to advocacy, and in some corners, for deepening the U.S relationship with Taiwan I — I don’t hear anyone saying that the United States should support a Taiwanese declaration of independence because I think that’s generally recognized that — that would be very destabilizing within the relationship and might actually get everybody into a situation they would prefer to avoid But you do hear proposals to go as far even as revisiting the one China policy, and perhaps extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, which I think in Beijing’s eyes, would be the functional equivalent of a support for —

of U.S. support for a declaration of independence, or even just increasing military and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which — which are pretty tightly circumscribed at the moment by the Taiwan Relations Act, and a variety of policy guidelines that have put in place pursuant to — to that What was interesting is there was a statement from the Chinese government about two or three weeks ago that reiterated kind of the standard boilerplate in China’s approach to Taiwan, which is that China — China reserves the right to use force to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence or seceding, as the Chinese sometimes refer to it But there was a twist on this one, which is that it — it was written in a way that implied that the Chinese might use force to prevent the current situation from going on forever, right? And so, the current situation is with — one of which Taiwan does not enjoy legal independence, but does enjoy de facto autonomy, de facto independence, in a sense And so, if — what the Chinese may be signaling is that we’re — we’re not willing to live with the status quo forever, we do expect that Taiwan will come back to the mainland at — at some point Xi Jinping has sometimes sort of vaguely referenced 2049 as the date by which he hopes this will be accomplished And so, what you may be seeing is — is posturing on the Chinese side as well in an effort to try to dissuade the United States or other countries from doing more to support Taiwan From — from my perspective, the — the really critical issue in the U.S. Taiwan relationship is enabling Taiwan to defend its independence, its de facto independence, from a PRC assault, or an attempt at coercion, and there’s — there’s a lot of work to be done there as well I don’t think that is a fight that Beijing would go into enthusiastically or they were going to lightly because it would be very challenging and if Xi Jinping or a successor started a war over Taiwan and lost, that could be an existential threat to the regime, but I think that the danger of that is probably growing in the coming years because the Chinese think that the military balance in the Strait is becoming more favorable to them At the same time, they worry that the political balance in Taiwan is becoming less favorable to them, as more of a distinctive Taiwanese, as opposed a Chinese national identity emerges, and as Beijing friendly politicians get left farther and farther in the dust, at least over the last decade or so And so, if you put those things together, you could have a scenario where the Chinese believe 5, 10, 15 years from now, that the political window is closing while the military window is opening, and I think that would be quite dangerous >> John Haskell: You know, we — we titled this discussion about the global PR battle and, Carla, depending on — on how vaccine efforts develop, what will the impact be on the — on the relations between the countries? Because this is, of course, a global problem, so it would have — it potentially could have a lot of impact on how the world sees both countries? >> Carla Freeman: Well, apparently, there are about 90 different efforts around the world to develop a vaccine, but when you have a — President Trump is urging the United States to produce one on warp speed and we certainly have the capacity to do that I think — I think were we to develop a — a — a vaccine before China, for example, that would be an incredible PR win And I — and — and at that point, we, ideally, will not squander that by actually producing and sharing the vaccine with other countries There are — there are — there are a lot of areas where we could this to bolster our — our flagging influence, including in the Western Hemisphere, where we’ve seen the coronavirus actually served to push countries in our own hemisphere, whether it’s Mexico or Brazil, more closely into China’s arms And similarly, I think tomorrow China is meeting with — with a group of African nations, Xi Jinping, himself, will host them to discuss a range of different topics, but will include health And if we are concerned about China’s growing influence in that continent, having — playing a — a role there in distributing a vaccine would be an exciting opportunity and etcetera We would have a real — a real opportunity to — to show that the United States still leads and is a — is a source of global public goods >> John Haskell: And — but there’s no sign of that coin, right, Hal, potentially? >> Hal Brands: Sure So, I mean I think that the — the Chinese very much view it

in the — the same light And so, you can think of this as a space race that actually matters, right? And so, that the space race of the 1960’s was hugely important symbolically, but — but really had kind of limited impact for the quality of life of people on earth, this one matters symbolically because it has profound implications for the quality of life of people around the world And so, I think — you know, the — the Chinese are certainly hoping to be the first to develop a vaccine, that — that would go a long way in erasing some of the reputational damage that China suffered from being the source of — of the virus, and from mishandling the initial response And it’s been reported certainly in — in the open press that there has been — there have been hacking attempts originating from China against many of the institutions in the United States and elsewhere that are also engaged in vaccine R&D And — and so, I think that the Chinese very much view this as an aspect of the competition with the United States, one that is going to have a significant impact on how the legacy of the crisis plays out in this long term competition >> John Haskell: Either of you can start on this But how effective is China — has China been, as we go through the crisis, and maybe even before that, in exploiting the challenges the U.S. has in its relationship with Europe? >> Carla Freeman: Sure, and I think it’s had mixed effects Some countries [inaudible] I think it was news in The New York Times, they focused on — on Serbia and — and Serbia’s reaction to — to China’s health diplomacy There been other countries that like — in Eastern Europe, in particular, where China has — has used its — its — its distribution of masks and other — other [inaudible] to — those countries to — to show its friendship building on its — its economic relationships with those countries But I think China’s strategy has backfired in — in many countries in the region in — in Europe, who have seen — been very concerned for a while that — that China was having a corrosive influence on the European Union’s integrity, and that that might even be a — an objective of — of — of China’s — a strategic objective associated with China’s Belton Road strategy And — and — and so, when you have part of the region sending messages of — of — of appreciation and thanks to China, and part of the region, part of Europe worrying about — about the — the source of the virus, about China’s — China’s heavy handed propaganda, promoting its — its — its superior system, and so forth, it — it actually has enhanced tensions across Europe I’m — I’m having trouble sort of reconciling with that Some of the polling data though that come — is coming out of Europe that — that also, shows that — that — that China’s — that support for China on some of the publics has remained fair — fairly strong throughout this whole crisis, relative to the United States And I think that’s something we really — the United States really needs to repair I think the — the virus — the coronavirus — this pandemic has — has also — has also highlighted that, although there are opportunities for the United States to exploit because of China’s mixed impacts on the European of response — reaction to China’s — China’s health diplomacy, there also is — is a problem in that the United States has also failed to support its allies during the — this — this pandemic, and — and so there’s a lot of negative fallout from that >> John Haskell: Hal? >> Hal Brands: So, I think that, in general, the balance of European government opinion seems to have become less enamored of China since the crisis began, for — for reasons that — that Carla mentioned But it’s — it’s useful to draw the distinction between European countries and then Europe as an entity, and — and precisely because Beijing has been successful in cultivating countries, mostly in — in eastern and southern Europe, and in finding ways of fracturing the unity of the EU on China related issues The EU, as an entity, has not moved dramatically,

as a result of this crisis And this — this is a challenge for the United States because I think the United States is accustomed to thinking that Europe will be on America’s side and whatever the great geopolitical competition of the age is, but the Chinese have actually pursued a fairly adept strategy for weakening the cohesion of Europe, and making it harder for Europe to respond as an institute The United States, by the way, has actually done some of that itself, and so this administration has pursued a strategy that’s relatively hostile to the EU And moreover, I think, that while a number of your and governments are increasingly skeptical of Chinese, and tensions, and actions, they’re also just frankly worried about the reliability of the United States And so, if — if — the — the ask that the United States is making is, okay, now go get tough with China, now go pick a fight with China Well, we have to be able to deliver on this saying, and we will be there with you when the going gets tough What — what happens now, not just in — in Europe, but frankly, around the world is that countries are a little bit hesitant to walk out on that limb for fear that it might be sawed off behind them >> John Haskell: So, I’ll hit you both with the same last question I can do a little, quick hitter What do you think is the most — so, Hal, we’ll start with you What is it — what do you think is the most important opportunity we’re missing in this challenging time with respect to our relationship to China? >> Hal Brands: So, I think the most important opportunity that we have missed on so far is the idea that came out of the UK basically to expand — and reform the G7 to make it a group of ten leading democracies that would work together in developing alternatives to reliance on Chinese 5G technology, in particular, this has been the big stumbling block in the United States We go to our allies around the world we say, don’t use Huawei And they say, okay, what’s the alternative, right? And so, I think if you actually could get a partnership of — you know, we’ll call it the free world and developing democratic 5G alternatives, that could potentially be a game changer in a competitive sense But the problem is that we kind of got in the way of that one by proposing that Russia also be included in an expanded G7, which made it seem as though we were missing the point a bit And so, I’d like to see us pick up that idea and — and put our weight behind it because I think that has a lot of promise >> John Haskell: So, Carla, for you Hal just told us what he thought the most important missing opportunity to U.S. — the most important opportunity the U.S has missed in this challenging time with respect to its relationship to China What’s yours? >> Carla Freeman: I am going to read — reveal my — my — my support for multilateral institutions here and say that we have missed an opportunity to — to lead — in — in — globally The United States has — has — for many decades — been the leading provider of global public goods We founded the — the WHO or were a key — key founding member of the WHO We have exercised leadership in many multilateral forums and I think we — we could have used this — this opportunity to demonstrate our support for — for a collective action around a global challenge and we have not done that for philosophical reasons I think more than anything else And I think that is a — an — a missed opportunity because it’s given enormous space for — for China to pro — promote its idea of a shared future or a common future for mankind And that may seem clumsy to us in the West, but it actually has a fair amount of traction And we have to remember, China’s audience isn’t just the United States, and it’s not just Western democracies, but it is the rest of the world, and that’s a big, big world, and it’s also the Chinese people And so, I think we — we missed an opportunity to — to show the world that we — we can still lead effectively, and the world still needs us >> John Haskell: Carla, Hal, we’re — we’re out of time but I want to thank both for — for joining us here at the Library of Congress for our — for our conversation on the future of democracy series and we appreciate it Thank you both very much >> Hal Brands: Thanks for having us >> Carla Freeman: Thank you